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Abstract
The development of forensic intelligence relies on the expression of suitable models that better 
represent the contribution of forensic intelligence in relation to the criminal justice system, policing 
and security. Such models assist in comparing and evaluating methods and new technologies, 
provide transparency and foster the development of new applications. Interestingly, strong 
similarities between two separate projects focusing on specific forensic science areas were recently 
observed. These observations have led to the induction of a general model (Part I) that could guide 
the use of any forensic science case data in an intelligence perspective. The present article builds 
upon this general approach by focusing on decisional and organisational issues. The article 
investigates the comparison process and evaluation system that lay at the heart of the forensic 
intelligence framework, advocating scientific decision criteria and a structured but flexible and 
dynamic architecture. These building blocks are crucial and clearly lay within the expertise of 
forensic scientists. However, it is only part of the problem. Forensic intelligence includes other 
blocks with their respective interactions, decision points and tensions (e.g. regarding how to guide 
detection and how to integrate forensic information with other information). Formalising these 
blocks identifies many questions and potential answers. Addressing these questions is essential for 
the progress of the discipline. Such a process requires clarifying the role and place of the forensic 
scientist within the whole process and their relationship to other stakeholders.
Keywords: forensic science; comparison process; organisation and decisions; model; integration
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1. Introduction
The fundamental principle of forensic intelligence is that, instead of treating each case individually 
with the aim of assisting the court (i.e. evidential focus), a multi-case focus and more holistic 
approach based on the study of crime phenomena should be followed [1, 2]. The structured and 
systematic exploitation of crime traces is essential to produce knowledge that will guide strategic, 
operational and tactical decisions, in particular in models such as intelligence-led policing [3]. The 
main objective of such models is to monitor repetitive crimes that are evolving and complex due to 
their underlying organised nature. However, such clues do not represent the whole crime picture 
and a collaborative approach is required to provide actionable intelligence to decision makers. 
In a previous paper [4], we described the induction process that led to the proposition of a forensic 
intelligence framework. Not only will the implementation of a general model break bar iers between 
specific fields of study in forensic science and intelligence, but it will also help solve issues that are 
common across crime and trace types (hence the name ‘transversal’). Indeed, a transversal model 
has the potential to offer a common vocabulary and an integrated framework, and will also assist in 
defining cross-discipline difficulties. It was observed that fundamental issues were treated in a 
similar way in two apparently different areas (i.e. illicit drugs and false identity documents). The 
general framework proposed in Part I [4] is a first significant step towards defining forensic 
intelligence, situating its role in policing, and exposing the potential opportunities and limitations.
The framework serves as a support for the development, implementation and evaluation of specific 
intelligence processes. It helps in the making of good and objective decisions about the way to 
elaborate and implement its particular components (or building blocks) and defining its relations 
with other information processes in order to maximise its overall efficiency. Part II further develops 
the general framework by exploring the main generic building blocks presented in Part I. The 
objective here is to further develop the modelling and generalisation efforts initiated in Part I and to 
provide illustrations of the potential use and limitations of the transversal model through two 
independent fields of application, i.e. illicit drugs and false identity documents. This contribution also 
aims to highlight the outcome of these formalisation efforts, which is to bring together in a common 
framework a qualitative approach (used to build the framework), quantitative approaches (i.e. 
metrics, scores, threshold values, error rates) and a Bayesian approach.
Part II proposes scientific and rational criteria useful to properly conceive and operate a forensic 
intelligence system, and to compare and assess alternatives. Based on these criteria, the paper then 
explores the decision points that are crucial in defining the process architecture as well as in 
assisting in making objective decisions in real caseworks. Building blocks related to the comparison 
process and the evaluation systems are first presented. The development of these particular blocks 
is mainly driven by forensic science and those blocks work relatively independently from general 
intelligence and investigative data. This separation is however neither logical nor practical when 
other building blocks are considered as they concern the many people and organisations that are 
involved in the whole forensic intelligence process. The reflections regarding these other 
components or building blocks must thus be seen as shared by all participants collaborating in the 
overall process.
2. Relevant criteria in conceiving and operating a forensic intelligence system
Forensic intelligence ultimately serves different objectives in a wide variety of operating contexts 
where decisions are often of a different nature than evidence-based court decisions [5]. Systems 
implementing the forensic intelligence process must be pragmatic enough to sustain uncertain 
reasoning while remaining scientifically rigorous and controllable. To cope with these constraints 
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and manage risks of reasoning and acting under potentially false hypotheses, it is argued that a 
balance must be struck between four general parameters: credibility, integrity, timeliness and 
flexibility [6-9]. The performance of any forensic intelligence system as well as its building blocks can 
be assessed using these four parameters regardless of the nature of the trace considered. The 
notions are defined hereafter:
- Credibility depends on the system ability to limit the erroneous positive information it 
provides. In other words, credibility is related to the reliability of the positive results 
provided by the system. Credibility is measured through the rate of type I errors (i.e. to 
consider true a hypothesis that is actually false).
- Integrity depends on the system ability to limit the erroneous negative information it 
provides. In other words, integrity is related to the completeness of the positive results 
provided by the system (or wholeness, entireness, referring to the Latin origin of the word 
integrity). Integrity is measured through the rate of type II errors (i.e. to consider false a 
hypothesis that is actually true). 
- Timeliness is associated with the system ability to provide information that can be used by 
decision-makers in a timely fashion. Time is critical when analysing criminal activity. Ideally, 
in order to be useful, the analysis response should be compatible with the rapid evolution of 
the phenomenon of interest [10]. Indeed, relevant information obtained at the wrong time 
would not only be useless but might be detrimental to the efficiency of further actions [11].
- Flexibility is the ability of the system to adapt to and account for the different contexts in 
which forensic intelligence may be applied [12]. The crime environment is dynamic and 
evolves rapidly. As a consequence, there is no universal system configuration that is 
adequate in every situation and flexibility is a key parameter of any evaluation system.
Flexibility and timeliness should both be maximised to provide actionable intelligence. In contrast, 
credibility and integrity cannot be maximised simultaneously since they evolve in opposite 
directions. For instance, a system that achieves high credibility but low integrity provides truthful but 
incomplete results, while a system that achieves low credibility and high integrity provides 
comprehensive but unreliable results. When considering the ability of the system to detect links 
among forensic case data, integrity is connected to the well-known risk of linkage blindness [13]
while credibility is connected to the risk of detecting links that are actually absent. It is hypothesised 
that the credibility and integrity of the system are the driving factors for decision-making in 
performing any forensic intelligence task. Any selection of a metric or of an evaluation system, any 
queries in a database or any risk assessment are based on these criteria to balance the decision in 
order to fit the results to the xpectations of operators. Finding the optimal trade-off between these 
criteria and the operational needs is a constant challenge for forensic scientist and intelligence 
analysts.
The following sections present the integration and role of the above criteria in regards to the 
different building blocks of the forensic intelligence process.
3. Comparison process: iterative selection of the ‘best’ metric
Once the features to be profiled are selected and extracted from specimens collected (see section 
5.2), a process of comparing profiles and measuring their similarity must be selected [14]. Contrary 
to a common misconception, this choice, or decision point, is not only important when conceiving 
the system, but also arises each time the system is used. In fact, the choice of the best comparison 
process depends on the operator objectives and the kind of problem at stake, which may vary 
according to the context within which the forensic intelligence process is operated (see section 6). 
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Thus, the system must enable a flexible and dynamic selection of solutions to compare profiles and 
measure their similarity.
Metrics are the generic solution for the comparison process irrespective of the nature of the trace 
(i.e. visual, physical, chemical or even digital). A metric is defined as “a transformation that adds a 
new layer of information since it starts with entities (i.e. profiles) and concludes with a measurement 
describing the degree of relationship between entities (i.e. scores)” [4]. They are used to compare 
and measure the (dis)similarity between specimens. They have the critical advantage of relying on 
explicit, transparent and verifiable rules. They can be used with both quantitative and qualita ive 
data, as demonstrated in previous work [15, 16]. Furthermore, metrics can be seamlessly integrated 
with additional statistical methods commonly used to manage and process big datasets typically 
encountered in forensic intelligence (e.g. principal component analysis).
Metrics, such as the Pearson correlation, the cosine function or the Manhattan and Euclidean 
distances have proven their relevance across different fields of study, such as illicit drugs, counterfeit 
medicines or false identity documents [14-19]. Figure 1 represents the distribution of score 
frequencies (i.e. intra- and inter-variability distributions) using organic impurities found in MDMA 
specimens (i.e. quantitative and continuous data) on the left and the visual characteristics of false 
identity documents (i.e. qualitative and discrete data) on the right. The individual results were 
discussed more thoroughly in previous research [15, 16]. As observed in Figure 1, once the scores 
are computed using metrics either as a degree of proximity or a distance, they can be treated 
independently of the nature of the specific trace and the type of data. Indeed, similar results are 
obtained, confirming the transversal nature of the comparison process. 
Insert Fig. 1
The resulting information in terms of intra- and inter-variability can be managed and assessed 
through a common process and the most fit-for-purpose metric can be rationally chosen. This was 
conducted in previous articles and can be found in [15, 16]. Detection error trade-off (DET) and 
receiver operating characteristics (ROC) curves as well as Tippett plots are recommended tools to 
assess and compare scientifically and numerically the performance of different metrics [20-24]. 
Tippett plot are used for empirical performance assessment, in particular to assess the likelihood 
ratio (LR) accuracy. Figure 2 represents an example of a Tippett plot that compares the performance 
of the squared cosine correlation metric for illicit drugs and false identity documents datasets.
Insert Fig. 2
These tools assist in identifying the most suitable metrics since they allow the measurement of type I 
and type II error rates [25] and both are indicative of the credibility and integrity of the process. At 
this point, it is important to mention that error rates associated with metrics have to be re-evaluated 
on a regular basis to ensure their adequacy to the evolution of crime patterns and crime markets. 
Timeliness is not really an issue regarding metrics since rapid computation facilitates the generation 
of almost immediate results, independent of the metric selected.
The iterative selection of the ‘best’ metric is a pivotal decision point within the forensic intelligence 
process since it affects the scores that will go through the evaluation system, which critically 
influences the ultimate suitability of intelligence products.
4. Evaluation system: proposal of an integrated framework
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Scores resulting from the comparison process must be interpreted as a link value through a 
formalised evaluation system. Approaches based on a deterministic or a Bayesian framework are 
common solutions across forensic literature and practice [25]. They are often regarded as 
antagonistic and mutually exclusive. In opposition to that view, an evaluation framework combining 
both approaches is advocated here to meet the flexibility criteria mentioned in section 2. The 
commonality between these evaluation approaches is their ability to assess credibility and integrity 
criteria through the expression of type I, and type II error rates. Both approaches have been 
presented and practically applied in [15]. Therefore, they will only be briefly described in the present 
article.
Let’s consider two profiles, A and B, and the two hypotheses ‘the profiles A and B are linked’; ‘the 
profiles A and B are not linked’ which represent H1 and H2, respectively. The notion of link may 
accept different meanings depending on the type of trace, its origins, and the level of generality and 
inference considered.
In the deterministic approach, a binary classification is postulated and a link is either present or 
absent. The score is compared against a defined threshold value that is chosen in accordance with 
what is considered acceptable by the operator and the organisation in a given operating context. In 
that approach, either H1 or H2 is true. False positive (type I error – reporting that a link is present 
when in fact it is absent) and false negative (type II error – reporting that a link is absent when in fact 
it is present) rates depend on the selected metric and threshold.
In the Bayesian evaluation framework, a likelihood ratio (LR) is calculated by dividing the probability 
of obtaining a particular score given the presence of a link by the probability of obtaining this 
particular score given the absence of a link.
The resulting LR is associated with a rate of misleading evaluation given the presence of a link (type I 
error) and a rate of misleading evaluation given the absence of a link (type II error). More elaborated 
LR formulas have been proposed but they are more appropriate to a criminal trial context where 
error rates have to be strictly measured and minimised, e.g. [26-28]. In contrast, in an intelligence 
perspective, pragmatism is necessary and there is a higher tolerance of risk [29].
Neither of these approaches can be considered to be systematically better. Ideally, both approaches 
need datasets of known sources to be properly calibrated. However, most of the time such datasets 
are unavailable and the common or different origin of specimens has to be hypothesised. The 
authors believe that the probabilistic approach has a pivotal advantage due to the fact that LRs are 
context independent, which is not the case of a deterministic classification. Being context 
independent is a major advantage in regards to the integration of link values in a formal memory. 
Indeed, link values expressed as LRs can be stored, searched and interpreted again in any new 
context. Furthermore, they can be quantitatively compared across different traces and combined 
with any other sort of forensic or alternative data. Figure 3 illustrates the different steps between 
the acquisition of profiles and decision-making according to the deterministic and Bayesian 
evaluation framework. 
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Insert Fig. 3
Expressing link values as a LR clarifies the limit between forensic science results and contextual 
information (prior probabilities and alternative intelligence) which are in principle within the 
competence of different professionals. Comparatively, the deterministic approach requires a mixing 
of both forensic and contextual information in order to define the decision threshold [25] but is 
more straightforward and pragmatic in the sense that interpretation delivers a ‘black or white’ result 
associated with false positive and false negative rates. Such a result can be easily handled and 
communicated, and is therefore appreciated when subsequent timely decisions have to be made. 
The disadvantage of the Bayesian approach is the fact that no decision is made, which revents 
reasoning a step further in the process (e.g. to form groups and classes among linked profiles that 
may facilitate the organisation and exploration of information as well as the elicitation of working 
hypotheses). Although assessing uncertainty may be important from a purely scientific point of view, 
it raises many difficulties in terms of information processing and requires sophisticated information 
management techniques such as fuzzy sets for instance [30]. This can be a drawback when facing 
large and and/or complex datasets where analysis and subsequent communication necessitate 
simplifications. 
Given that both approaches have advantages and disadvantages and that forensic intelligence may 
serve very different and evolving security tasks [12], it is advocated to implement them both within a 
dynamic evaluation system. Their combination enables reasoning towards the analysis step by 
considering in parallel several working hypotheses. The elicitation and management of several 
hypotheses is a powerful and flexible form of reasoning practiced pragmatically and intuitively in 
every day intelligence and investigative routine activity. However, it is hardly ever formalised, which 
hampers its implementation in computerised systems. In that regard, the expression of a framework 
that accounts for that form of reasoning is pivotal to fill this gap and bring together deterministic 
and Bayesian sub-models. The proposed framework is presented in Figure 4.
Insert Fig. 4
In the deep level, the relationships between entities (i.e. scores) are represented by link values, that 
is the presence/absence of a link (deterministic sub-model) and the likelihood of a link (Bayesian 
sub-model). On that basis, analysts may elicit in parallel different working hypotheses. In the 
working level, these link values are materialised or not, depending on each relevant hypothesis 
(WHa, WHb, WHc, WHn) formulated by operators in the forensic intelligence process (e.g. forensic 
scientists, intelligence analysts or investigators). In Figure 4, WHa considers that the link detected 
between grey and white entities according to the deterministic threshold is not significant. WHb
considers the links detected by the deterministic approach but disregards the potential link between 
grey and black entities supported by a limited or moderate likelihood ratio. WHc considers a link 
between grey and black entities that was not detected according to the deterministic threshold that 
is a link based on a moderate or limited likelihood ratio or based on the indirect link between grey 
and black entities. Analysis can be initiated based on these working hypotheses. At this stage, other 
forensic science information or alternative information may be leveraged to assess the relevance of 
each hypothesis. Thus, the boundary between the evaluation and analysis steps is not that clear 
within the forensic intelligence process [4].
A simple and routine example can be used to illustrate this framework. A burglary was committed in 
a factory and a DNA specimen was collected at the scene. When checked against the national 
database, a match was obtained with a profile related to one case included in a series of house 
burglaries committed two years earlier. In the deep level, this match can be assessed as the 
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presence of a link (deterministic sub-model) and as a very high likelihood ratio in favour of a link 
(Bayesian sub-model). In the working level, two hypotheses were drawn from the analysis: ‘WHa : 
there is a link between both traces since they have a common source’ ; ‘WHb : there is no link 
between both traces since the result is due to a random match’. Two scenarios may explain WHa : ‘a 
serial burglar deposited both traces’ or ‘a person who has legitimate access to both locations (house 
and factory) deposited both traces’. Each working hypothesis guided different decisions and 
operations. Investigations following WHa showed that the owner of the house was also an employee 
of the factory.
Through feedback and analysis of results and effects associated with the parallel hypotheses, an 
iterative process of adjustment and refining of the metric and evaluation system parameters is 
conducted. This requires the ability of the system to access the underlined information. 
Consequently, besides integrating deep and working model-related information, i.e. link values from 
both interpretation approaches in the memory and working hypotheses thereon, we support 
integrating the underlying profiles and similarity scores as well. This basic information is helpful to 
perform the continuous and dynamic reassessment required by the perpetual evolution of crime 
problems, and parallel hypotheses thereon [31].
To support decision-making, such an integrated framework enables the rapid optimisation of error 
rates according to accepted risks of reasoning falsely under each of the hypotheses considered. 
These risks are defined in relation to specific contextual intelligence challenges, objectives and policy 
decisions. Operators and their organisations may manage and endorse uncertainty and risks 
differently [6]. In that regard, the role of the forensic scientist within their organisation and within 
the forensic intelligence framework may guide the way both evaluation approaches are combined 
[32].
5. Discussion of the other building blocks
The comparison process and evaluation system are only a small part of the whole forensic 
intelligence process. They raise many questions downstream and upstream. It is essential to place 
them in context and discuss each step or building block. Indeed, decision points and organisational 
issues related to the forensic intelligence process must also be part of the modelling effort. It is
always difficult to address these issues as they are more complex and are organisational dependent. 
Furthermore, they depend upon the organisational risk appetite relating to a particular offense 
category (e.g. the risk tolerance would probably be different in a counter-terrorism context in 
comparison to the monitoring of volume crime). However, the formalisation and modelling efforts 
initiate the discussion and offer possible solutions.
5.1.Detection and deciding which traces to profile
Available data that are used in the comparison process rely on the traces detected and collected [4]. 
At this early stage, data may already be biased in some ways depending on what is favoured 
consciously or not by detection stakeholders (police, border guards, community or any organisation 
facing the crime problem at stake). Their efforts may be oriented towards a particular phenomenon, 
specific traces or type of cases. For instance, police may concentrate their resources during a certain 
period of time on the methylamphetamine (MA) market to disrupt it and, as a result, MA seizures 
would increase. Meanwhile, MDMA, cocaine, and heroin seizures could apparently decrease. This 
increase and respective decrease do not reflect the actual criminal activity but rather the activity of 
the police [33]. In regards to false identity documents, alerts and instructions diffused to agents in 
the field will influence their detections. The choice of specific instrumentation will also make them 
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able to detect specific features at the expense of others (e.g. ultraviolet light sources would assist 
them in detecting low quality counterfeits but could distract them from detecting higher quality 
forgeries). While targeted and intelligence-led operations are undisputedly vital to the success of 
policing [3, 34], the risk of over-focusing operations on known patterns exists. Given this risk, the
ability of the forensic intelligence process to catch the unexpected must be developed. Rigid rules
must be avoided and a more randomised or intelligent ‘out of the box’ approach must be adopted on 
a regular basis.
Once crime traces are detected, a choice has to be made to decide what data are going to be 
profiled or not. This decision has a dramatic influence on the perception of crime problems that will 
result from forensic intelligence. The seriousness of the case is frequently viewed as the major 
criterion to guide this decision, mainly due to political or legal reasons. However, it might be more 
than often a misconception. Indeed, once properly aggregated, less serious and less spectacular 
cases, considered as fragmented and weak signals, may provide a considerable basis for the 
understanding of repetitive, prolific and organised crimes. For instance, the decision not to profile 
small illicit drug seizures (e.g. less than 10 grams) could critically neglect potential information on 
the retail levels of drug rings, or hide criminal organisations that intentionally work with small 
batches to reduce the judicial risk. Similarly, deciding not to profile false travel documents used by 
illegal immigrants may neglect human smuggling organisations from crime analysis. Furthermore, 
this also raises the question of representativeness. It is important to ensure that an adequate 
number of specimens are analysed to ensure they are representative of the crime market (or at least 
what is known to be the crime market) [10].
In selecting the traces to profile, the authors argue that the (apparent) seriousness of the case is not 
the driving factor and that more scientific and rational reasons prevail. Besides the trace relevance 
[32] and its quality [4], the main guiding criterion for forensic intelligence is to find a balance 
between a systematic approach and the available resources. Indeed, the more comprehensive the 
approach, the more significant the intelligence products will be. However, at the same time, more 
resources will be required and the management of information will become more complex. Knowing 
these limiting factors, a balanced approach that processes from the general to particular is 
advocated, as introduced in [31]. At a first level (surface level profiling), all traces should ideally be 
systematically profiled using surface features (effortless to extract and manage). This helps to point 
out and select sub-problems which deserve greater attention through a tighter and more resource-
intensive follow-up, based on more detailed features (modus operandi level profiling) or on a 
restricted number of cases (series level profiling). For instance, the use of physical profiling or one 
chemical profiling technique to compare illicit drug seizures could be used first (surface level 
profiling) to obtain quick links between cases as demonstrated in [16, 35, 36]. The use of the whole 
set of chemical profiling techniques could then be applied when sub-problems are identified to 
obtain more detailed features or when a link is identified using circumstantial information and a 
confirmation of this link is required using chemical profiling (i.e. in this case, the entire set of 
chemical profiling techniques would be applied to a restricted number of seizures). 
5.2.Deciding how to profile selected traces
From conceptual and practical viewpoints, it is not possible to extract all features of a trace. In fact, 
modelling traces is inherent to the recognition and extraction of their features. A model being 
inevitably a simplification of real objects, a conscious selection of features has to be made [37]. The 
criteria presented in Table 1 can be used as a guide to select relevant features. Some criteria are 
feature-intrinsic, i.e. they depend on the feature itself and its origin, while others are feature-
extrinsic, i.e. they depend on the observation/measurement methods. These decision criteria do not 
depend on the level of detail at which the forensic intelligence process is engaged (general or 
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particular). However, it is important to mention that it is difficult to fulfil all these criteria in practice. 
Furthermore, these criteria are most often based on hypotheses (e.g. investigation of the intra- and 
inter-variability of the different features is only possible if the hypothesis of a common/different 
source is inferred and assumed). As a consequence, a balance has to be struck between intrinsic and 
extrinsic criteria.
Insert Table 1
The example of the printing technique of personal data in a counterfeit identity document can be 
provided to illustrate these criteria. The printing technique has a priori a rather low intra-variability 
since there is no reason for the forger to regularly change his printer (additional costs). Although not 
necessarily high, inter-variability is judged higher than intra-variability since different forgers may 
have different printers (inkjet, toner, thermo transfer, thermo sublimation, etc.). Complementarity is 
more difficult to evaluate. For instance, the choice of a particular technique to print personal data 
has no relation (i.e. weak or no dependence) with the way the forger will cut the document’s edges 
or how he will imitate the watermark. However, this choice will influence (i.e. stronger dependence) 
the technique chosen to print the document background, as it is easier to use only one printer rather 
than two. The printing technique is interesting as it enables the determination of type of equipment 
that was used (printer type, possibly its make and model) which is directly related to the 
representativeness. The forger has to have access to such a device, which describes the modus 
operandi. Comparability is not a problem when comparing the printing technique only. However, it 
may be an issue when comparing more specific features (such as the printing mode, colours or 
printing defects) since inkjet and toner printers might not be comparable for instance. In this case, 
availability and completeness are not an issue, as forgers will have no choice but to print personal 
data on every counterfeit document. These criteria could become an issue when considering forged 
documents where only the photograph was modified. Concerning the extrinsic criteria, observing 
and determining the printing technique of personal data can be done with a stereomicroscope or 
even a simple magnifying glass. Such an examination is not destructive, quick and does not require 
expensive equipment or extensive training. Its resource cost is low and its accessibility very high 
since every laboratory and almost every border control point possesses the required equipment and 
knowledge to perform this examination. However, it is difficult to rate sensitivity, specificity and 
reliability since such an examination is highly dependent on the operator competence. For a 
qualified examiner, recognising printing techniques is not a tough challenge but it may be less 
obvious to a less qualified operator. The last criterion, namely adaptability, is, a priori, not an issue 
since the development of new printing techniques is relatively slow and can be easily managed 
through a technological follow-up. The arrival of a new printing technique on the market would 
simply necessitate adding it to the previous list.
At this stage, it is important to develop the representativeness criterion in more details as the choice 
of particular features has a direct impact on the links that will ultimately be detected and inferred 
[15, 31]. For instance, analysing the organic impurities of illicit drugs present in the specimen or the 
physical characteristics of the specimen will result in different types of links. Indeed, a link obtained 
using the organic impurities will indicate a common origin at the early stage of production whereas a
link obtained using the physical characteristics might indicate a common tableting process, which 
could take place in another location and laboratory. The combination of several features within the 
profile is essential to reach the optimal trade-off between the above-listed criteria. Some of these 
are antagonistic, such as representativeness and resource requirement. Indeed, it is always tempting 
to multiply the features to profile (visual, physical and chemical) in order to increase 
representativeness, but this has in turn a direct effect on the amount of resources needed to 
perform the profiling task. As demonstrated in [16], in an intelligence perspective, there is no need 
to apply multiple analytical methods for the chemical profiling of MDMA specimens. It was shown 
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that the information gap resulting from using only one technique was negligible while the time 
needed to obtain results was greatly reduced. Furthermore, when combining features, their 
complementarity or correlation is an issue that must be investigated. Finally, finding the optimal 
trade-off between the intrinsic and extrinsic criteria is not a straightforward task and requires 
continuous research to remain adequate in regards to the evolution of crime patterns and markets.
5.3.Decisions in regards to the integration of information: organisation of the memory and 
fusion of alternative information
The integration of the different levels of forensic information presented in section 5.1 is difficult as is 
the management of parallel hypotheses discussed in section 4. In order to overcome these issues, 
the architecture of the memory must be flexible and dynamic and allow the operators to 
continuously ‘zoom in - zoom out’ across information levels and navigate among hypotheses. If the 
memory is not flexible, it would run the risk of being obsolete, unable to support timely decisions 
and unable to adapt to the evolution of crime problems [4]. Besides its dynamic nature, the memory 
should always record the basic information that underlies links and link values (e.g. the profiles and 
the scores) in order to enable a backtracking capacity, as argued in section 4. This enables to re-build 
previous state of knowledge in light of new information at any time.
Recognising that forensic information is insufficient to understand criminal activity and that the aim 
of the memory is to gather information from different sources to obtain a holistic and shared view, 
should alternative information be integrated in the memory? If yes, how and to what extent should 
they be integrated? 
These questions are difficult to answer as they require approaches to manage data from different 
sources, formats and values. While we believe that forensic science results are best used in 
combination with alternative information, we do not recommend building a unique database that 
centralises and captures all kind of data. Systematisation and computerisation of information play a 
critical role in the organisation and implementation of the memory. Indeed, it would be 
inconceivable to store and analyse numerous, diverse and complex information without the help of 
computers. However, it has to be complemented by the human capability of drawing inferences and 
thinking critically. The memory should be shared among the different units of the organisation [38], 
which fosters a collaborative approach to address crime problems. The memory and its architecture 
have to be thoroughly considered in regards to the organisation objectives and role. However, 
administrative issues should not be the main focus. Indeed, the memory should mainly be conceived 
and implemented in order to be able to answer the questions raised in regards to the crime problem 
at stake. Apart from the forensic scientist, different people, such as crime/intelligence analysts and 
decision makers will be involved in the decision concerning the architecture of the memory and the 
way information should be fused. Proper integration is a real challenge as people running the system 
may be disconnected from the collection, investigation and intelligence functions due to 
organisational, operational or political barriers.
6. Discussion: challenges and risks associated with forensic intelligence 
Forensic intelligence suffers from limitations that can be concretely measured against two related 
risks that need to be mitigated and balanced: type I error and type II errors. To handle these 
limitations, the people in charge of generating forensic intelligence and those utilising it have to 
draw the right balance between two competing factors introduced above: credibility – limiting 
erroneous positive information – and integrity – limiting erroneous negative information. The notion 
of expected utility known to decision theory [39] could be a useful tool to approach the management 
of these risks in a transparent and objective manner. However, a completely formal approach should 
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be avoided since intelligence tasks require pragmatism and flexibility, as presented in section 2. 
Besides technical limitations due to features measurement and the comparison metric used, finding 
the right compromise depends on the understanding of the environment, the context of the decision 
to be made, potential pitfalls of an erroneous decision, as well as on priorities and resources of the 
decision-maker and his organisation. These parameters affect the preference (or limited rejection) of 
type I versus type II errors and should guide the mindset of the decision-makers in regards to the 
kind of problem they are facing. 
For instance, when the problem to prove is at stake (typical of an evaluative mindset [40]), the risk of 
asserting something that is absent (type I error) should be minimised since a higher expected utility 
is generally placed on certainty (i.e. credibility) than on integrity (i.e. completeness) of information. 
Accepting a false assertion is viewed in such contexts as the main issue. Indeed, in court, a type I 
error could lead to a false conviction (miscarriage of justice), an outcome that has to be avoided at 
all costs. 
Conversely, when the problem to find is at stake (typical of an investigative [40] and intelligence 
mindset [10]), the risk of failing to assert something that is present or true (type II error) should be 
minimised since a higher expected utility is generally placed on having something to start to work 
with (a hypothesis to check, a lead to follow, a list of candidates resulting from a database search to 
process, a suspect to identify, arrest or interview) than on the reliability of information. Integrity is 
viewed as more important than credibility [41]. Indeed, the risk of missing what has to be found (i.e. 
suffering from an incomplete perception or linkage blindness) is perceived as the main issue in such 
contexts. For instance, when dismantling a forgery factory, investigators desire to check the profile 
of false documents found at the factory against the database in order to uncover previous cases that 
may be linked to the production of the factory, thus assisting in establishing the dimension of the 
production and the seriousness of the forger’s offence (i.e. providing false documents to terrorist 
organisations or to underage alcohol drinkers). In this situation, type II errors would desirably be 
avoided (to avoid linkage blindness) and type I errors be accepted since the database search would 
only point to cases that should be examined more deeply. Indeed, the list of documents potentially 
connected that was highlighted through the database search may contain false positives. However, 
these false positives will be evaluated further and refined in the light of alternative information. A 
similar procedure is applied in DNA or fingerprint database searches where one expects the system 
to return a “hit” result if the donor is indeed recorded in the database (the opposite would comprise 
integrity). It is expected and accepted that the system returns a list of candidates which most 
probably contains some false positives. In such cases, the focus is generally placed on integrity 
rather that credibility, even if an adequate balance must be struck depending on the context of any 
database search.  
The risks pertaining to different investigative and policing decisions may vary greatly and therefore 
requires a flexible and dynamic system. For instance, the decision to execute a search warrant (an 
invasive, overt and irrevocable measure) is associated with different risks than the decision of 
including a new case in a series at a preliminary stage of a criminal investigation. Both decisions 
might be made based on the analysis of the same set of data, but cannot afford the same error rates 
due to very different consequences. In tactical contexts, if the aim is to utilise resources efficiently
and focus efforts by limiting results to the most concrete hypotheses/leads or, conversely, if the aim 
is to open and follow every possible lead, then the first option would need to minimise type I error
(i.e. maximise credibility) whereas type II errors should be minimised in the second option (i.e. 
maximise integrity). In regards to strategic intelligence, a fine trade-off between error rates is not as 
important and could rather be solved by choosing a consensus known as the equivalent error rates 
(EER). There is indeed no need to finely balance error rates when considering a problem at a general 
level or over the long term, except when considering extreme situations in order to assess ‘worst 
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case’ and ‘best case’ scenarios. However, credibility and integrity of the system should be explicitly 
stated since forensic intelligence can support critical strategic decisions (e.g. deciding if a particular 
crime problem is considered as a priority threat). For instance, if the profiling of illicit drugs or false 
identity documents reveals a high percentage of linked seizures, this might indicate that the crime 
market is highly structured and facilitated by organised crime. As a consequence, more resources 
may be allocated to address these crime problems. 
It is important to underline at this point that decisions regarding the problem to find should not 
systematically be associated with a need for high integrity. Similarly, decisions related to the 
problem to prove do not constantly require maximising credibility. Such a dichotomous view would 
be simple but is inappropriate. Indeed, selecting the right trade-off relies not exclusively on the 
problem at stake and how it is perceived, but also on available resource, on the organisation 
strategy, on what solution is permitted or not according to the legal framework, and on the context 
in which the decision has to be reached. For instance, the problem to prove may be understood very 
differently when addressed during the first steps of an investigation (prove someone’s likelihood to 
be a member of an organised crime group in order to wiretap them) or in court (prove their guilt). 
Therefore, decision issues in investigative and policing contexts must be flexible enough and take 
into consideration exceptions and special cases. Forensic scientists cannot be simply withdrawn in 
the laboratory as it is currently often the case, but have to collaborate with other stakeholders. The 
objectives of the forensic intelligence process and the context in which it will be used should be clear 
to the forensic scientists in order to tailor and fine-tune their contribution.
If a forensic intelligence unit exists in an organisation, its place and role should be well defined [6]. 
Its role should not be limited to the rather technical aspects of the forensic intelligence process. It 
must integrate the implementation and connection of all the building blocks described here and in 
[4]. It is, therefore, important to identify the different interactions with the other stakeholders in the 
organisation. The authors believe that collaboration is one of the most important elements of the 
process. As mentioned by Rossy and Ribaux [42] and Gray [43], “collaboration is a process through 
which parties who see different aspects of a problem can constructively explore their differences and 
search for solutions that go beyond their own limited vision of what is possible”. The implementation 
of a forensic intelligence process is only possible if the different stakeholders have direct access to 
the different functional areas of the organisation.
7. Conclusions
Currently, different pieces of information belong to separate forensic science disciplines with little 
consideration given to their relation with the broader information management of the police and 
security [10]. Indeed, the current situation tends to restrain forensic scientists within their 
specialisation and reinforces the concept of centralised laboratories distant from and with no direct 
connections to police organisations [42]. The over-specialisation and the gap between forensic 
science and policing can be considered as obstacles in using the full potential of information 
conveyed by forensic case data through the development of a forensic intelligence framework. 
However, as demonstrated in [2] and here, forensic scientists should actively participate in the 
development of forensic intelligence models and also be responsible, in collaboration with other 
stakeholders, to define decision points that are crucial for a successful implementation of these 
models.
The modelling and generalisation efforts conducted in [4] and continued here offer a baseline to 
address the many issues, challenges and decision points raised by the conception and operation of 
an efficient forensic intelligence function. These formalisation efforts are pivotal since they 
contribute to:
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- Structure and assist further developments by focusing attention on specific building blocks 
as well as on their common functioning. Formalisation provides modularity and reusability of 
the components and solutions, thus minimising the need to reinvent the wheel;
- Facilitate the implementation of forensic intelligence processes in education and training 
programs, in practice and in computerised systems;
- Monitor how information is processed, provide transparency and prevent what can be called 
risky black box effects;
- Offer tools to test, compare and evaluate scientifically the operation of any forensic 
intelligence process using explicit critical success factors;
- Bring together qualitative and quantitative approaches as well as Bayesian and non-Bayesian 
evaluation systems, showing that there is no need (and no use) to “choose a side”. This 
development is necessary to widen and further define the role and contribution of forensic 
science in policing and security while maintaining its coherence as a discipline.
Forensic intelligence takes advantage of the wealth of information that result from the trace. 
Considered as the remnant of a punctual source, activity or event, traces are one of the most 
tangible and exploitable effects/results of crime phenomena [29, 44]. The scientific processing of 
traces as well as their proper fusion with alternative information in a collaborative approach offers a 
unique opportunity to understand criminal activities, in particular when they are repetitive, prolific 
and organised. Illicit drugs and false identity documents trafficking are only illustrations among 
others. A general forensic intelligence framework was presented. Whatever the type of trace 
considered, the successful implementation, integration and development of such a framework is 
complicated since many people (with often different objectives and interests) are involved at 
different levels of the process. We argue that forensic scientists have an important role to play in the 
implementation of such a framework. Furthermore, they should realise their key role in that 
endeavour and engage themselves in the forensic intelligence debate. Although more developments 
are required, the formalisation efforts presented in [4] and here initiate the discussion and offer 
possible solutions for the implementation of forensic intelligence on a routine basis. These 
developments are essential as they will ensure the progress of forensic science as a whole.    
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Table 1
Decision criteria to select the features to profile
Intrinsic criteria
(relative to the features themselves and their 
origin)
Extrinsic criteria
(relative to the observation and measurement 
methods)
Non destructiveness: must not alter the trace 
integrity
Low intra-variability: no or low variation among
traces of a same origin
Sensitivity: ability to return a positive result 
when the feature is present
High inter-variability: significant variation among 
traces of different origins
Specificity: ability to return a negative result 
when the feature is absent
Complementarity: the features must be as 
independent as possible 
Reproducibility and reliability: consistency of 
results when the extraction/acquisition 
operation is executed by different operators or 
equipment, at different times or locations
Representativeness: reflects the features and 
traits of the source(s)/activity(ies) at the origin 
of the trace (materials, equipment and method 
used) – as far as a person comes into question, 
privacy issues must be taken into account
Low resource requirement in terms of costs, 
time, equipment, knowledge and training since 
the extraction/acquisition operation will be 
repeated for each new trace
Comparability: features of a given trace must be 
comparable to the features of the others to 
evaluate their similarity/dissimilarity
Accessibility: equipment and knowledge 
available to stakeholders that are prone to 
operate the profiling task
– reciprocally, traces accessible to stakeholders 
who possess the required equipment and 
knowledge to operate the profiling task
Availability and completeness: the feature is 
constantly and completely 
observable/measurable in the population of 
interest (all the traces considered)
Adaptability: ability to follow-up on the 
evolution and mutations of the 
observed/measured feature
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Fig. 1. Distributions of intra-variability (grey) and inter-variability (black) scores using the squared Cosine function and 
normalised on a 100% scale for MDMA seizures (left) and counterfeit identity cards (right).
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Fig. 2. Tippett plots presenting the Log10 likelihood ratios for MDMA seizures (solid line) and counterfeit identity cards 
(dashed line) according to the squared cosine correlation metric. Black curves (on the right) represent likelihood ratios 
when the hypothesis of a link is true, while grey curves (on the left) represent likelihood ratios when the hypothesis of the 
absence of a link is true 
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Fig. 4.Proposed framework regarding the elicitation and management of several parallel working hypotheses (WHa, WHb, 
WHc, WHn) based on link values evaluated through deterministic and Bayesian approaches. The grey, white and black dots 
represent profiles (i.e. forensic entities). Solid lines represent links considered as present, different levels of dashed lines 
represent different levels of likelihood of links. 
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Highlights
 Development of a transversal forensic intelligence process to guide the use of any forensic 
science case data in an intelligence perspective 
 The comparison and evaluation processes that lay at the heart of the forensic intelligence 
framework are developed
 The issues and challenges raised by the conception and operation of an effective forensic 
intelligence function are addressed 
 The article brings together qualitative and quantitative approaches as well as Bayesian and 
non-Bayesian evaluation systems
 These formalisation efforts are pivotal to ensure the progress of the discipline
